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OUTSOURCING INCOMPETENCE:
AN ESSAY IN HONOR OF PAUL VERKUIL
Arthur J. Jacobson ∗
I first encountered Paul Verkuil in the late 1970s, when I started
teaching administrative law. I came across an article in the University
of Chicago Law Review. 1 It was a study of procedures for informal
adjudication by administrative agencies. Its author was a professor
teaching law at North Carolina. I remember it vividly. (About how
many articles you read over thirty years ago can that be said!) It was
everything I wanted my own work to be: passionate about the subject
yet dispassionate about the results, simple yet unobvious, beautiful yet
true. I remember wondering, “Who is this guy? He’s amazing!” He
was Paul.
The next time I encountered him was close to twenty years later,
when he became dean at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
Administrative law, it turned out, did not last. Paul did. It was only
after he stepped down from the deanship to become a beloved colleague
that I learned where that article came from. I was organizing a
symposium on the legal theory of Baruch Spinoza. Paul told me that his
grandfather, Leendert, was a devoted reader of Spinoza. He said that he
had not so much studied Spinoza as he had inherited him from Leendert.
He even wrote a moving recollection of that inheritance for my
symposium. 2 It was then that I understood who “this guy” really was.
That passionate dispassion, unobvious simplicity, and beautiful truth of
the article I had read in the late 1970s was the voice of Spinoza, refined
and personified in Paul’s grandfather, and transmitted by him to Paul.
What I was reading then in that article about procedures for informal
adjudication was Spinoza, specifically Spinoza doing administrative
law.

∗ Max Freund Professor of Litigation & Advocacy, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
Yeshiva University. I would like to thank my assistant, Captain Erik Wilson of the United States
Marine Corps, without whom this Essay could not have been written. I would also like to thank
Professor Eric Jensen for his discussions with Captain Wilson.
1 Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739
(1976).
2 Paul R. Verkuil, Recollections on Spinoza, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 667 (2003).
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Nowhere are Paul’s Spinozist virtues more prominently on display
than in his recent monograph, Outsourcing Sovereignty. 3 In it, Paul
unfurls a tight and elegant argument against the pathologies of the
privatization movement in the federal government. He dates the
privatization movement to the Iran-Contra affair, which first came to
light in 1986. The significance of Iran-Contra, Paul suggests, is that
certain members of the Reagan Administration decided to privatize
foreign policy once Congress refused to finance the contras’ guerilla
campaign against the Nicaraguan government. But perhaps the origins
of the privatization movement can be traced back even further than IranContra, to the deregulation that began during the Carter
Administration—a steady contraction of the reach of government that
began with deregulation and continued with privatization. 4
Whatever the source of privatization, its consequences, Paul
argues, have been clear. Government has overreached in outsourcing
government functions. It has outsourced not only government functions
that are amenable to outsourcing, but also those that are not: the
“inherent” government functions. Roughly speaking, those are the
functions that require the exercise of judgment by public officials acting
as agents of the sovereign. The sovereign, Paul argues, is “We the
People,” made sovereign by the Constitution of the United States.
Functions amenable to outsourcing, in contrast, are those that do not
require the exercise of sovereign judgment; they are functions that may
be well-defined by contract and closely monitored by “Officers of the
United States.” The key to the distinction between government
functions that are inherent and those that are not, in Paul’s vision, is
accountability: the accountability of an agent to his principal, of
“Officers of the United States” to “We the People.” Government is thus
accountable only when its officers exercise the judgment entrusted to
them over inherent government functions, and having exercised that
judgment, only when they ensure its implementation either through a
bureaucracy subject to their command and control or through
adequately defined and monitored contracts with private sources.
Government has failed to be accountable over the past generation in
both possible ways—impermissibly farming out the exercise of
judgment, while failing to implement such judgments as have been
properly made.
3 PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT
FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2007).
4 One could go back even further. Robert Timberg argues that the die for Iran-Contra was
cast towards the end of the Vietnam War, when the men who were to become the authors of IranContra were officers serving in Vietnam. ROBERT TIMBERG, THE NIGHTINGALE’S SONG 14
(2006). The lesson they learned from Vietnam, Timberg documents, was the betrayal of a
military effort by a feckless political class. Id. at 15. They were not going to let that happen
again.
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The unaccountability of government, in turn, has its own
pernicious consequence concerning the competency of government.
Officials who fail to exercise judgment over inherent government
functions—or who neglect to inscribe that judgment either in adequately
staffed and motivated bureaucracies or in suitably defined and
monitored contracts—invite incompetence of many kinds, all of which
have marked the era of privatization and all of which Paul documents.
If officials will not do their jobs—if they will not exercise judgment
over inherent government functions, or will not staff and motivate a
bureaucracy, or will not define and monitor contracts with private
sources—then either the job will not get done or it will get done badly.
That is the lesson of Paul’s study.
I want to take that lesson one step further. I want to place the
incompetence that is the product of privatization in a larger context. I
want to argue that the incompetence produced by privatization is
inseparable from a broader crisis of state competence. I want to say
why there is a broader crisis, and why that crisis is unavoidable under
present conditions.
The poster boy for Paul’s argument about privatization must surely
be Blackwater, one of the private security firms that, at the height of the
Iraq war, provided “battlefield personnel for escorting convoys,
protecting civilian leadership (e.g., Paul Bremer), and even
interrogating prisoners.” 5 Paul’s account of Blackwater focuses on the
pathologies of privatization:
In addition to conducting interrogations, assignments such as
securing convoys or protecting Paul Bremer or even the Secretary of
State often involve indirect or even direct combat confrontations.
Indeed, sometimes contractors cause military actions even if they are
not assigned to carry them out. The four Blackwater employees who
were dismembered and mutilated in Fallujah, where they ended up
while guarding a convoy, is a grim reminder of how the military
must react to contractor actions. The Marines had to secure that city
after that gruesome event, which was not in their plans beforehand. 6

Paul’s conclusion about the Fallujah incident is ineluctable. The
Department of Defense, it appears, outsourced to Blackwater a task that
it regarded as amenable to outsourcing, rather than as an inherent
government function. Were the Department of Defense to offer a
justification of this decision, they would argue that providing security to
a supply convoy is akin to an ordinary civilian security operation—like
night watchmen at a construction site or armed guards accompanying an
armored car—and is thus distinguishable from combat, which, as most
today would probably agree, is an inherent government function. But
5
6

VERKUIL, supra note 3, at 27.
Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted).
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the reality of a theater in combat does not permit so fine a distinction to
be drawn. The Blackwater employees had necessarily to engage in
combat, and their defeat drew the Marines into a combat operation they
had neither desired nor planned. Contracting with Blackwater to
provide security for convoys thus wound up diverting the United States
military from operations they had in fact planned, and calling into
question the competence of a military that could so unwittingly be the
cause of its own distraction.
Paul’s Blackwater story is bad enough. The real story is worse. I
asked Erik Wilson, a captain in the United States Marine Corps and a
first-year law student at Cardozo, to look into the Fallujah incident a
little more closely. Here is what he found.
The U.S. Army did not hire Blackwater directly. The prime
contract, part of the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP), was between the Army and Halliburton. It was a contract
to supply Camp Ridgeway, an Army base near Fallujah. (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1.

Subcontracts for Supplying Camp Ridgeway

Halliburton then subcontracted the supply contract to KBR, and
KBR subcontracted it to ESS. It was ESS that hired Blackwater to
provide security for the convoys to Camp Ridgeway. Four subcontracts
connect, or separate, Blackwater from the ultimate recipient of its
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services. That looks like an awfully long chain of subcontracts. But
things were not so simple.
Let’s start with the top of the chain. It was actually KBR’s
predecessor, Brown & Root, and not Halliburton, that had the first
LOGCAP contract with the Army. This was back in the 1990s, at the
beginning of the LOGCAP program. In 2002, Halliburton created KBR
(merging two of its subsidiaries, Brown & Root and M.W. Kellogg),
and replaced the former Brown & Root as the prime contractor. 7
Halliburton was thus the prime contractor at the beginning of the Iraq
war in 2003. The LOGCAP contract Halliburton signed at that point,
known as LOGCAP III, was the second renegotiation of the initial
LOGCAP contract between the Army and Brown & Root. 8
Halliburton’s role under LOGCAP III was only to guarantee KBR’s
services, and the Army and other federal auditing agencies dealt directly
with KBR, not with Halliburton. 9 Halliburton was involved in
LOGCAP III only because it owned KBR. Thus, after Halliburton
divested itself of KBR in 2007, 10 KBR once again became the prime
contractor in the LOGCAP IV contract, which is just now coming into
effect.
Now let us consider the bottom of the chain. ESS did not hire
Blackwater directly. It hired Blackwater through a proxy company,
Regency Hotel and Hospital Company of Kuwait. What happened was
this: Regency and Blackwater had submitted a joint proposal to replace
ESS’s existing private security contractor, Control Risks Group. Once
Regency/Blackwater won the contract, they renegotiated it to make
Regency ESS’s subcontractor and, in turn, make Blackwater Regency’s
subcontractor. Apparently Blackwater wanted this arrangement so it
could get exclusive credit for the successful security operations. 11
The presence of Regency in the chain is important because a
dispute erupted between Blackwater and Regency about the armoring of
the vehicles to be used in protecting the convoys. According to Captain
Wilson, Blackwater used its subcontractor status to “blackmail”
Regency, saying that Regency now had to provide weapons, armor, and
7 Dana Hedgpeth, KBR Prepared to Sever Last Ties to Halliburton with Stock Swap, WASH.
POST, Mar. 29, 2007, at D01.
8 Each LOGCAP contract has a maximum ten-year lifespan before it requires renegotiation.
9 See, e.g., Safeguarding Taxpayer Dollars in Iraq: An Insider’s View of Questionable
Contracting Practices by KBR and the Pentagon: Hearing Before the S. Democratic Policy
Comm., 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Charles Smith, former Chief of Army Field Support
Command, Field Support Contracting Division) [hereinafter Safeguarding Taxpayer Dollars],
available at http://dpc.senate.gov/hearings/hearing45/smith.pdf.
10 See Hedgpeth, supra note 7.
11 MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG.,
PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF BLACKWATER’S ACTIONS IN
FALLUJAH 8 (2007) [hereinafter PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS], available at http://www.cspan.org/pdf/blackwater100207.pdf.
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other supplies, and that Blackwater would not supply them. The
apparent aim of this strategy was to get Regency either to pay for
Blackwater’s supplies or default on their contract, 12 which Blackwater
would try to take over at an increased profit once Regency was no
longer in the way. Captain Wilson believes that Blackwater probably
could not have gotten the security contract on its own and that it teamed
with Regency for credibility, then tried to cut Regency out.
Partially as a result of this dispute between Regency and
Blackwater over equipment funding, the Blackwater team was
extremely underequipped and underprepared for the March 31, 2004,
mission in which four Blackwater employees died.
I want to pause here in telling the story to make a comment.
Outsourcing government tasks to a firm in the private economy subjects
those tasks to the push and pull of the economy. I do not have the
illusion, and neither does Paul, that elements of the bureaucracy are
without their own motivations and distortions, but when you sign up
with the private economy, you agree to participate in the private
economy’s motivations and distortions. Let’s be blunt. There was a
dispute between Regency and Blackwater over who would pay to armor
the security for the convoys. That dispute led to the under-equipment
and under-preparation of the security team on which the four
Blackwater employees died. Their deaths led the military to launch an
invasion of Fallujah. So here it is: A contract dispute led to a major
development in a major war of the United States—and that is Paul’s
point.
Of course, similar disputes can and do produce similarly horrible
results in the language of the bureaucracy, instead of the language of the
market. There is no doubt that the bureaucracy has its own version of
contract disputes and its own version of letting hell to pay. One cannot
say, “oh, had the market not been involved, things would have turned
out just fine: The four men on the supply mission would not have been
killed and the United States would not have had to invade Fallujah.”
That is not Paul’s argument, nor is it mine. Nevertheless, the motive
driving the decision-makers in the Blackwater incident was profit,
rather than some other motive that we might attribute to the
bureaucracy. While profit is OK as a motive for screwing up in
Fallujah, that is not the question. The question is whether profit should
be the guiding principal in directing our actions on a matter of state—on
a matter of national interest. If it were not economically efficient for
the United States to survive, would Richard Posner support it?
Now here is where the story gets particularly bad. Captain Wilson
found that the LOGCAP contract between Halliburton and the Army—
12

See id.
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LOGCAP III—provided that security for the convoys would be the
responsibility of the Army. The subcontract between Halliburton and
KBR contained the same provision. The LOGCAP III contract
explicitly prohibited the use of weapons by any agents of the prime
contractor or any of its subcontractors, and also had several clauses
referencing two orders from United States Central Command
(USCENTCOM) and two orders from the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) that similarly restricted the use of weapons by civilian
contractors. 13
In spite of these provisions and orders, ESS hired Blackwater to
run security for them; KBR was aware of that fact, and it is unknown if
Halliburton or the Army were aware. Captain Wilson is of the opinion
that if Halliburton or the Army were not aware, then it would have been
due to deliberate ignorance. 14 But it was not just ESS that was illegally
hiring private security contractors; KBR itself hired at least three private
security firms, and even privately armed some of its own employees. 15
Blackwater agreed to provide ESS with a thirty-four man security team
that would establish a command center, have risk management
expertise, and provide security personnel to protect installations and
convoys. In violation of this contract, the Blackwater team whose fate
we are discussing was short of manpower and equipment—
communications equipment, ammunition, weapons, body armor and
armored vehicles. The convoy had not been risk-assessed, as was
required by the contract between Blackwater and ESS. This lack of
risk-assessment resulted in Blackwater guiding the convoy through
Fallujah, rather than the safer roads around it. Blackwater also breached
the contract by failing to provide six personnel to ride along with the
convoy, sending only four instead. They also failed to provide rear
gunners for the security vehicles and were short on automatic weapons
to protect the vehicles.
The actual convoy ended up in the middle of Fallujah because of
the lack of equipment and planning. The convoy’s destination was
Camp Ridgeway. It was supposed to arrive on March 30, 2004.
Because of the lack of planning, the convoy got lost and arrived at
13 Complaint at 6, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc.,
No. 1:10-cv-00530 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter KBR Complaint], available at
http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/03/31/KBR2.pdf.
14 PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 11, at 7; see also Memorandum from the
Majority Staff to the Members of the House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform
(Feb. 7, 2007), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/
2007_hr/070207-memo.pdf; Jenny Mandel, Officials Admit Private Security Firm Was Hired
Under Iraq Logistics Contract, GOVERNMENTEXECUTIVE.COM (Feb. 8, 2007),
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0207/020807m1.htm.
15 KBR Complaint, supra note 13, at 6-8. The Department of Justice is currently suing KBR
for its failure and the failure of its subcontractors to abide by LOGCAP provisions that forbade
the use of private security forces. Id.
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Camp Fallujah, a Marine Corps Base. Once at Camp Fallujah, the
Blackwater contractors located some KBR employees (since there were
no ESS employees there), who told them how to get to Camp Ridgeway
and warned them against going through Fallujah proper. The convoy
departed Camp Fallujah, but was promptly sent back by a U.S. Marine
Corps checkpoint, for reasons unknown. They spent the night at Camp
Fallujah and departed for Camp Ridgeway in the morning. The convoy
deliberately circumvented the Marine Corps checkpoint, instead going
through an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) checkpoint. The trucks
were ambushed and the Blackwater operators were killed. There are
conflicting reports as to whether the ICDC soldiers actually escorted the
convoy into Fallujah and facilitated the ambush. 16
The deaths of the Blackwater contractors created a national and
international outcry. There was an immediate call to invade and pacify
the city of Fallujah. The Marines, who controlled the ground forces
around Fallujah under the ultimate supervision of the Army, requested
that Fallujah not be invaded, saying that invasion would be
counterproductive to the progress the Marines were making there.
Local residents of Fallujah had voluntarily returned the bodies of the
Blackwater contractors, and the Marines were confident they would
have the perpetrators in custody within forty-eight hours. Marine Corps
Generals Mattis and Conway warned that attacking Fallujah at that time
and in the manner suggested would cause the exact explosion in
insurgency that in fact occurred after the invasion of Fallujah. Their
supervisor, Army General Ricardo Sanchez, nonetheless recommended
the siege of Fallujah to the Secretary of Defense, who ordered the
invasion to take place almost immediately. 17
I tell this story at length to alert all of us, myself included, to the
perils of remitting important matters of state either to the bureaucracy or
to contract. Both failed in Fallujah. How could the Army not know that
Blackwater was running security for the convoys going to Camp
Ridgeway? There is an answer to that question and it is not a happy
one. Captain Wilson found that there was a severe lack of Army
oversight of the LOGCAP contract. 18 The LOGCAP contract is an
Army contract, so supervision began with the Army. But responsibility
for supervision continued up through the ranks of the Department of
Defense, ultimately implicating at least half a dozen agencies within the
Department, with overlapping responsibilities for ensuring the proper

16
17

PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 11.
Richard S. Lowry, A Short Excerpt from New Dawn, OP FOR (Mar. 14, 2010), http://opfor.com/2010/03/a_short_excerpt_from_new_dawn.html.
18 See, e.g., INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REP. NO. D-2008-098, INTERNAL
CONTROLS OVER PAYMENTS MADE IN IRAQ, KUWAIT AND EGYPT (2008) [hereinafter INTERNAL
CONTROLS], available at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy08/08-098.pdf.
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execution of contract provisions and appropriate documentation of
contractor expenses. 19 One would think that having all these agencies
on the job would guarantee accountability. But each of the agencies
was seriously understaffed. Today, for example, the Department of
Defense has approximately 600 auditor vacancies. There has been a
direct correlation between the increase in contractor use and the
decrease in federal regulators of their contracts. 20 Even while the battle
for Fallujah raged on due to the deaths of the Blackwater employees, the
Department of Defense cut its contractor auditing staff by fifty percent.
The senior supervisor for Army contracting at the time, a civilian
federal employee named Charles M. Smith, had a staff of only two fulltime contracting personnel and a part-time lawyer to oversee $5 billion
worth of contracts. 21
So, did Fallujah teach us anything? Sadly not. The Army still
does not track how many contractors are used to execute the LOGCAP
contract, or how the subcontracts are specifically structured. 22 Given
this persistent failure of supervision, it is unsurprising that the Army
either did not know that KBR and ESS were hiring security contractors,
or simply failed to stop them. But the lack of supervision was actually
much broader in scope.
A Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD-IG) report from
2008 23 found that the Army’s failure to supervise contracts like
LOGCAP resulted in $7.8 billion worth of improperly documented
payments. Of all the Army’s payments between 2001 and 2006, 73%
failed to meet the Army’s own documentation standards. For
commercial contractors like KBR, 99.5% of the payments lacked
sufficient documentation. 24 The 2008 DOD-IG report is especially
useful because it includes two years of peacetime payments as well,
indicating that the Army’s accountability problems pre-date the war. 25
And if the Army cannot properly supervise its contracts in peacetime,
there is essentially no hope in wartime.
These problems of supervision are the result of a failure to set clear
regulatory guidelines, employ and train personnel, and hold violators
accountable. Thus, only half of the Army’s contracting specialists—and
only 2% of those on active duty—are adequately trained.

19 See, e.g., VALERIE BAILEY GRASSO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33834, DEFENSE
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CONTRACTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12-15
(2010) [hereinafter DEFENSE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CONTRACTS], available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33834.pdf.
20 See, e.g., id.
21 Safeguarding Taxpayer Dollars, supra note 9, at 2.
22 See, e.g., INTERNAL CONTROLS, supra note 18.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 4.
25 Id.
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Accountability controls over contractor payments have never been
finalized, there is still no formal training on LOGCAP contracts, and
most of the personnel dealing with LOGCAP contractors have no
LOGCAP experience at all. 26
In theory, if the Army had had enough personnel to keep track of
activities under the LOGCAP contract, it would have been possible to
hold Blackwater and other subcontractors, running all the way up the
chain to Halliburton, accountable for violating USCENTCOM and CPA
orders and for breach of the LOGCAP contract. The Department of
Justice is currently suing KBR for fraudulently passing along
Blackwater’s security costs to the Army without separately identifying
them as security costs. 27 The same evidence supporting this civil claim
would also establish a violation of the Major Fraud Act of 1988
(MFA), 28 which makes it a felony for contractors or subcontractors to
defraud the United States for amounts equal to or in excess of $1
million dollars (Blackwater’s original contract with Regency was for
over $11 million 29 ). The Department of Justice has the power to
prosecute civilian contractors and subcontractors providing support to
the Department of Defense for felonies committed in foreign countries
under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA).30
KBR, a qualifying subcontractor, could therefore have been prosecuted
under federal law for the MFA violation as if the crime had been
committed in the United States.
However, lawsuits and criminal prosecutions offer only limited
utility to theatre commanders: They are after-the-fact, take a long time,
and have uncertain results. Moreover, prosecution under MEJA comes
with its own distinct set of problems: The Department of Justice does
not have a MEJA division, and MEJA cases are referred back to local
United States Attorneys’ Offices, which are already heavily backlogged.
Of far greater utility are three summary powers the Army possesses that
can remove offending contractors from the conflict area while
deflecting the time- and resource-intensive process of litigation to
federal court in the United States. One method would have been simply
to prohibit access to Army bases by problematic contractors. This
would quickly and effectively sever their ability to execute their
contracts, and, most likely, their ability to stay in Iraq. According to
Captain Wilson, Army commanders favor this method because it
efficiently avoids the burden of litigation under conditions of armed

26
27
28
29

See, e.g., id.; DEFENSE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CONTRACTS, supra note 19, at 11-15.
KBR Complaint, supra note 13.
18 U.S.C. § 1031 (2006).
Walter Pincus, U.S. Pays Steep Price for Private Security in Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
2007, at A17.
30 18 U.S.C. § 3261.
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conflict and limited resources. The Army also had the power to exclude
contractors from Iraq altogether. Finally, the Army could have
canceled, or threatened to cancel, any portion of the LOGCAP contract
“tainted” by Blackwater.
Of course, the Army declined to use any of its summary powers.
Why was that? Even if no relevant Army personnel knew about
Blackwater’s operations prior to the ambush, they certainly knew about
the operations afterwards. But still, the Army took no decisive action to
end Blackwater’s services or the use of private security contractors in
violation of weapons regulations and the terms of the LOGCAP
contract. Why not? The simplest answer is that the Army deemed these
services necessary to the larger war effort—that it was simply unable or
unwilling to fill the void that would have been left if Blackwater and
other private security contractors like it were suddenly gone. Likewise,
according to this rationale, if the Army had known about the violations
of USCENTCOM and CPA orders, and of the LOGCAP contract up
and down the chain of subcontractors, it still would have taken no action
for the very same reason.
Consider the record. Every moment in this sorry tale is marked by
one species or another of incompetence. It is, to be sure, incompetence
owing to privatization. But the incompetence is of broader reach than
that.
It is incompetence of governance altogether, where the
incompetence owing to privatization is a symptom, not a cause.
We end where we began, in the company of Baruch Spinoza.
Spinoza first proposed that sovereign is he who takes responsibility for
the welfare of the subjects. 31 He proposed this as a matter of fact, of
stern realism in contrast with what he regarded as the idealism of
Hobbes’s rather more chaste and withdrawn sovereign, who claims only
to guarantee the peace. Spinoza is the prophet of the welfare state, the
state that lives or dies by the welfare of its subjects. In such a state,
every function imaginable is, at root, an inherent government function.
There is no necessary distinction between public and private—or rather,
the distinction between public and private is constantly being negotiated
and redrawn. What is private is private only for reasons of state and not
for its own reasons. We do not, in fact, have Hobbes’s state, a state that
is responsible for keeping the peace and nothing else. Spinoza was
right. Our state is Spinoza’s state. It is a state that is subject to limitless
demands. Whether Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, Harry Truman’s
Fair Deal, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, or George Bush’s
Compassionate Conservatism—these are minor variations on a theme.
The theme is that the state can never say no. If there is a problem in the
world, the state is responsible for fixing it. The state is always being
31 See Arthur J. Jacobson, Law Without Authority: Sources of the Welfare State in Spinoza’s
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 681-85 (2003).
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pressed to the limits of its competence, and all too often beyond. At the
same time, because the boundary between public and private is in
constant negotiation, corruption and conflict of interest are baked into
the core. That is not the fault of those who rule us; it is their fate, and
ours, which we must, as Spinoza told us, accept with grace.
Years ago, I studied one way that the sovereign outsources
judgment that has been enormously successful in many countries for
close to two hundred years. At its most elementary, this outsourcing
takes the specific form of fiduciary obligation, in which one person, a
fiduciary, exercises a judgment that legally binds another person, the
beneficiary of the judgment. Because the fiduciary’s judgment is a
judgment that legally binds the beneficiary, it is necessarily a sovereign
judgment, for it is only the judgment of the sovereign that can create or
change another’s legally binding obligation. 32
The fiduciary is
necessarily the delegate of sovereign judgment.
The legal system instantiates this initial delegation of sovereignty
in a series of constructions based upon, and elaborating on, the fiduciary
obligation. The constructions range from agency and trust, to joint
venture and partnership, to the corporation and the limited liability
company. Limited liability is the consummate expression of the
delegation of sovereign judgment inasmuch as it replicates in the private
sphere a partial sovereign immunity, which simultaneously shields both
the managers of an enterprise and its investors from liability to outside
parties. 33
Fiduciary obligation and the myriad of associational structures
built on it thus present a series of successful, and ancient, ways of
outsourcing sovereignty. Of course, each of these ways comes with its
own set of problems and frustrations. Each needs constant monitoring
and adjustment. But on the whole, these structures do the job the
sovereign has assigned them to do: self-legislation in contract and the
exercise of judgment on behalf of another in discharge of fiduciary
obligation. So the state can, in fact, outsource a certain kind of
32 What marks the sovereign as sovereign and distinguishes it from every other social
institution is precisely the power to create and change legal obligation. Of course, the sovereign,
like any other social institution, can take on other tasks as well. Nothing limits it to changing and
creating legal obligation. It can feed and it can clothe, it can educate, it can worship, build roads
and pick up the trash. But none of these other tasks is unique to sovereignty. Only changing and
creating legal obligation is.
33 On the delegation of sovereign judgment in general, see Arthur J. Jacobson, The Private
Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the Common Law,
29 BUFF. L. REV. 599 (1980) (rejecting the nexus of contracts account of the corporation in favor
of a delegation account). The question whether the institution of contract represents a delegation
of sovereign judgment is controversial and difficult, and I shall not address it here. I took the
position in the Buffalo Law Review article that it does not, because the essence of sovereign
judgment is creating or changing legal obligations for another, which contract cannot accomplish.
Id.
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judgment, but only on a very strict condition: that the recipients of the
power of judgment be subject to the discipline of the market. That is
what permits the outsourcing of judgment to succeed. An outsourcing
of judgment that simply puts a government function in private hands
without subjecting it to a discipline of any sort—whether of politics or
of the market or of bureaucratic coordination—cannot possibly succeed.
The recipient of an undisciplined delegation of duty will use its powers
at the expense of the public and for its own private good. That is what
happened in Fallujah.

